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# Trust Repair between a Military Organization and a Local Population: A Pilot Study

*Ritu Gill*

*Angela R. Febbraro*

*Megan M. Thompson*

**Defence R&D Canada**  
Technical Memorandum  
DRDC Toronto TM 2009-157  
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Principal Author

*Original signed by Ritu Gill, PhD*

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Ritu Gill, PhD

Defence Scientist

Approved by

*Original signed by Matthew Duncan, PhD*

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Matthew Duncan, PhD

Head, Collaborative Performance & Learning Section

Approved for release by

*Original signed by K.C. Wulterkens*

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K.C. Wulterkens

for Chair, Knowledge and Information Management Committee

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## Abstract

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This study was designed to support the Applied Research Project (ARP) entitled, “JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander,” developed at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) – Toronto. The objective of this project is to examine the “Public” aspect of the Joint, Interagency, Multinational, & Public (JIMP) paradigm, which is a relatively new focus for many militaries and poses some of the greatest challenge in terms of interfacing with non-military players; moreover, the costs of losing the “hearts and minds” of a local population has significant implications for mission success and for the security of the soldiers deployed in counterinsurgency contexts. This pilot study will support a subsequent larger study examining trust violation and trust repair between military organizations and the local population the military is assisting. Recent research in the organizational psychology literature has found that in some cases (e.g., integrity-based trust violation), denial of responsibility is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. apology), whereas in other cases (e.g., competence-based trust violation), an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. denial). This study examined the applicability of these findings to complex international military engagements using a scenario-based experimental paradigm. Initial trust in the military was found to be strong enough to be violated when a trust violation occurred, providing evidence that allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate trust. Analyses of the manipulation checks indicated that some adjustments are required to strengthen the trust violation manipulation for the larger study, whereas the trust repair manipulation was found to be strong. Qualitative analyses of participants’ responses regarding the restoration of trust between the military and local population revealed several themes that are consistent with current approaches adopted by the Canadian Forces (CF) for improving trust and cooperation with a local population in theatre.

## Résumé

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La présente étude visait à étayer le projet de recherche appliquée (PRA) intitulé « Éléments interarmées, interorganisationnels, multinationaux et publics (IIMP) essentiels du domaine public : exigences à l’endroit des commandants tactiques » élaboré à Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC), à Toronto. L’objectif de ce projet est d’examiner l’aspect « public » du paradigme IIMP, une approche relativement nouvelle pour un grand nombre de militaires et le plus grand des défis pour les organisations militaires en ce qui a trait aux relations avec des parties non militaires; de plus, les coûts associés à la perte du « cœur et de l’esprit » d’une population locale a des incidences importantes sur la réussite d’une mission et la sécurité des soldats déployés dans un contexte de contre-insurrection. La présente étude est une étude pilote sur laquelle s’appuiera une étude à plus grande échelle qui examinera les bris de confiance et la restauration de la confiance entre les organisations militaires et la population locale à laquelle ces organisations apportent de l’aide. Dans la littérature en psychologie organisationnelle, des études récentes portent à croire que, dans certains cas (p. ex. pour un manquement à l’intégrité), la dénégation est un mécanisme plus efficace de restauration de la confiance que la présentation d’excuses, tandis que dans d’autres cas (p. ex. pour un manquement à la compétence), la présentation d’excuses est un moyen plus efficace de restauration de la

confiance que la dénégation. La présente étude s'est penchée sur l'applicabilité de ces résultats aux engagements militaires internationaux complexes à l'aide d'un paradigme expérimental fondé sur des scénarios. On a comparé la confiance avant un bris de confiance et après, et découvert que la confiance était plus élevée avant un bris de confiance, ce qui montre que la confiance initiale envers les organisations militaires était suffisamment solide pour être altérée par le bris de confiance. Les analyses qualitatives des réponses des participants quant aux comportements qu'ils auraient souhaité que les organisations militaires adoptent pour accroître leur confiance ont permis de dégager plusieurs éléments qui concordent avec les démarches actuelles suivies par les Forces canadiennes afin de raffermir la confiance et la volonté de collaboration avec la population locale dans le théâtre des opérations. D'après les résultats de l'étude pilote, il faudra apporter quelques modifications pour renforcer les manipulations visant à briser la confiance; les manipulations visant à restaurer la confiance se sont, quant à elles, révélées solides.

## Executive summary

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### Trust Repair between a Military Organization and a Local Population: A Pilot Study:

[Ritu Gill; Angela R. Febraro; Megan M. Thompson]; DRDC Toronto TM 2009-157; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto.

**Introduction or background:** Recent research in the organizational psychology literature has found that in some cases (e.g., integrity-based trust violation), denial of responsibility is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. apology), whereas in other cases (e.g., competence-based trust violation), an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. denial). The applicability of findings from the organizational psychology literature to complex international military engagements was explored in this study. The primary focus of this pilot study was to determine the effectiveness of the trust violation and trust repair manipulations, and to assess participants' initial baseline level of trust and whether or not allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate that trust. A secondary purpose was to examine participants' qualitative responses regarding trust restoration between the local population and the military organization providing assistance.

**Participants and Method:** Fifty civilian participants read a scenario and imagined themselves as a local citizen of a fictional country, Safia, which was depicted as experiencing conflict due to the rising power of a local terrorist organization. A fictional military, Massey military had entered Safia to deal with the terrorist threat and to re-build Safia by providing improved health care and road/travel conditions, and political infrastructure. Embedded within the scenario were the trust violation and trust repair manipulations. Participants either experienced the competence-based trust violation manipulation, the integrity-based trust violation manipulation, or no trust violation (control). Furthermore, participants experienced the apology trust repair, the denial trust repair, or no trust repair (control). Participants completed several questionnaires assessing manipulation checks, trust in the military, and two open-ended items on trust restoration and similarities of Safia to a real country.

**Results:** Results of the manipulation checks suggest that adjustments need to be made to the trust violation manipulations in the scenarios. No changes need to be made to the trust repair manipulation as this manipulation was found to be strong. Consistent with expectations, initial (baseline) trust was found to be significantly higher than trust assessed post violation, indicating that allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate initial trust. Participants' responses regarding restoring trust between the military and local population revealed several themes, with the most dominant theme being that participants ( $n = 19$ , 38%) would have liked the Massey military to have had more effective communication with the local population and to have included the local population in their work. In response to being asked "if Safia were a real country what country would it be?" the majority of participants perceived Safia to be Afghanistan ( $n = 33$ , 66%). This perception of Safia as being Afghanistan suggests a component of realism to the study, rather than perceiving Safia as an artificial country with no real-life relevance.

**Significance:** Based on the results of the manipulation checks for trust violation, it appears that adjustments need to be made to the scenarios for the subsequent larger study. In contrast, no

changes need to be made to the trust repair manipulations. Consistent with expectations, initial (baseline) trust was higher than trust assessed post-violation, indicating that allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate initial trust. The trust restoration responses provided an indication of what participants, imagining themselves to be local Safians, believed the military needs to do to restore the trust of the local Safian population. Results suggested a range of behaviors that the military should engage in to restore trust, with the dominant theme being communication with the local population and including the local population in work. Such findings are consistent with previous research that suggests that one strategy for combating mistrust of the military amongst civilians is for the military to engage in reconstruction and development projects that take into account local community needs.

**Future plans:** Future plans include making adjustments to the current scenarios to strengthen the trust violation manipulations for the larger research study. In addition, while the focus of the pilot study was not on examining trust repair, the larger study will focus on assessing the effects of trust repair on subsequent trust. Ultimately, the goal of the pilot study and the subsequent larger research study is to contribute to a better understanding of trust violations and trust restoration between military organizations and the local population being assisted by military organizations.



## Sommaire

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### **La restauration de la confiance entre une organisation militaire et une population locale : une étude pilote**

**Gill, R., Febbraro, A.R., et M.M. Thompson; RDDC Toronto TM 2009-157;  
Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada – Toronto;  
novembre 2009.**

**Introduction ou contexte :** En raison de la nécessité de mieux comprendre les aspects publics du paradigme IIMP, on a élaboré à Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC), à Toronto, le projet de recherche appliquée (PRA) intitulé « Éléments interarmées, interorganisationnels, multinationaux et publics (IIMP) essentiels du domaine public : exigences à l'endroit des commandants tactiques ». L'objectif du PRA est d'examiner l'élément « public » du paradigme IIMP, lequel est réputé poser quelques-uns des plus grands défis aux organisations militaires en matière de relations avec les parties non militaires. La présente étude est une étude pilote sur laquelle s'appuiera ce projet de recherche; elle explore le bris de confiance et la restauration de la confiance entre une organisation militaire (c.-à-d. les forces armées provenant d'un pays fictif appelé « Massey ») et la population locale à laquelle l'organisation militaire apporte son aide (c.-à-d. la population d'un pays fictif appelé « Safia »). Une recension récente de la littérature en psychologie organisationnelle permet de penser que, dans certains cas (p. ex. un manquement à l'intégrité), la dénégaration serait un mécanisme de restauration de la confiance plus efficace que la présentation d'excuses, tandis que dans d'autres cas (p. ex. un manquement à la compétence), la présentation d'excuses serait plus efficace que la dénégaration (Kim, Cooper, Ferrin et Dirks, 2004). Dans l'étude pilote, on a examiné l'applicabilité de ces résultats tirés de la littérature en psychologie organisationnelle dans les engagements militaires internationaux complexes. Le but de cette étude est donc de mieux comprendre les bris de confiance et la restauration de la confiance entre les organisations militaires et la population locale qu'elles aident, en recourant à la littérature en psychologie organisationnelle portant sur la confiance.

**Participants et méthode :** Les participants sont des étudiants universitaires (n = 50) à qui on a présenté l'étude comme étant une évaluation des perceptions de la relation entre les organisations militaires et la population locale à laquelle ces organisations viennent en aide. Les participants devaient lire un scénario et se mettre dans la peau de citoyens locaux d'un pays fictif, le Safia. Le Safia a été dépeint comme un pays en conflit à cause du pouvoir croissant d'une organisation terroriste locale. Une organisation militaire fictive d'un autre pays, le Massey, a été envoyée au Safia pour contrer la menace terroriste et pour reconstruire le pays en offrant de meilleurs soins de santé, en améliorant les conditions routières, en facilitant les déplacements et en fournissant une infrastructure politique. Les scénarios comportaient des manipulations visant à briser la confiance et à la restaurer. Les participants ont été soumis soit à une manipulation entraînant un bris de la confiance à l'égard de la compétence, soit à une manipulation entraînant un bris de la confiance à l'égard de l'intégrité, soit à aucun bris de confiance (groupe témoin). La confiance à l'égard de la compétence désigne la perception d'un sujet que la personne digne de confiance possède les habiletés techniques et interpersonnelles requises pour un travail (Butler et Cantrell, 1984), tandis que la confiance à l'égard de l'intégrité désigne la perception d'un sujet que la personne digne de confiance adhère à un ensemble de principes que le sujet considère comme

acceptable (Mayer et coll., 1995). Dans le groupe témoin, aucun bris de confiance n'a été commis. De plus, les sujets ont été soumis à une manipulation visant à restaurer la confiance par la présentation d'excuses ou par la dénégation, ou à aucune manipulation de restauration de la confiance (groupe témoin). Les participants ont rempli plusieurs questionnaires, visant notamment à vérifier les manipulations, à mesurer les croyances et les intentions à l'égard de la confiance, et à évaluer les perceptions de l'étude.

**Résultats :** Afin d'évaluer le niveau de confiance initial des participants et de déterminer si des allégations de comportement indigne de confiance seraient suffisantes pour briser cette confiance, on a mesuré la confiance au départ et après le bris de confiance. En général, conformément aux attentes, la distribution des moyennes pour les manipulations visant à briser la confiance à l'égard de la compétence ou de l'intégrité a indiqué que le degré de confiance était plus élevé avant (niveau initial) qu'après le bris, ce qui montre que ces allégations sont suffisantes pour briser la confiance initiale.

Les résultats de la vérification des manipulations indiquent généralement qu'en vue de l'étude à plus grande échelle qui sera réalisée ultérieurement, il faudra apporter des modifications aux scénarios afin d'atteindre un pourcentage plus élevé d'identification exacte des manipulations visant à briser la confiance à l'égard de la compétence et la confiance à l'égard de l'intégrité. Ces modifications viseront à rendre plus claire la nature des bris de confiance, par exemple, en limitant le concept de bris de confiance à l'égard de la compétence/de l'intégrité, pour retenir uniquement le manquement à la compétence/à l'intégrité. Ainsi, ces deux notions ne seraient plus diluées dans le concept de bris de confiance, que les participants risquent de considérer comme un manquement différent (ou témoin). Aucun changement ne doit être apporté à la manipulation visant la restauration de la confiance, car cette manipulation s'est avérée solide.

Les résultats sur la perception de l'étude ont permis de dégager plusieurs éléments prépondérants quant aux comportements qui, selon les sujets, auraient dû être adoptés par les militaires du Massey pour gagner la confiance de la population locale. La plupart des participants (70 %) ont signalé qu'ils auraient aimé que les militaires communiquent plus efficacement avec la population locale et qu'ils la fassent participer à leur travail. De plus, un grand nombre de sujets ont indiqué qu'ils auraient souhaité : qu'il y ait un calendrier ou un plan d'action quant aux interventions des militaires du Massey; que ces derniers assument la responsabilité de leurs actes; qu'ils aient plus de sollicitude envers la population locale; qu'ils respectent leurs promesses et qu'ils règlent le problème relatif à la culture des feuilles de cacao, un moyen de subsistance important pour la population safiane.

**Importance :** Le but principal de cette étude pilote était de mesurer l'efficacité des manipulations visant à briser la confiance et à restaurer la confiance, d'évaluer le niveau de confiance initial des participants et de déterminer si des allégations de comportement indigne de confiance étaient suffisantes pour briser cette confiance. D'après les résultats issus de la vérification des manipulations visant à briser la confiance, il semble que des modifications doivent être apportées aux scénarios pour l'étude à plus grande échelle à venir. Par contre, d'après les résultats de la vérification des manipulations visant à restaurer la confiance, il semble qu'aucun changement ne soit nécessaire. En ce qui concerne les deux autres volets (niveau de confiance initial, effet des allégations de comportement indigne de confiance), les résultats ont montré que, conformément

aux attentes, la confiance était plus élevée avant (niveau initial) le bris de confiance qu'après, ce qui montre que les allégations de comportement indigne de confiance sont suffisantes pour briser la confiance initiale.

Les réponses aux questions relatives aux « perceptions de l'étude » fournissent une indication sur les comportements que les participants, dans la peau de Saffians locaux, auraient voulu que les organisations militaires adoptent pour regagner la confiance de la population locale. Les résultats ont laissé entrevoir une vaste gamme de comportements, notamment l'importance d'assumer leurs responsabilités et de respecter leurs promesses. Toutefois, selon les sujets, les militaires devraient mettre l'accent sur la communication avec la population locale et sur la consultation des civils locaux (CBC News, 2009; Iribarnegaray, 2002; La Presse canadienne, 2009). Ces résultats concordent avec la recherche antérieure avançant qu'une stratégie à employer par les organisations militaires pour dissiper la méfiance des civils à leur égard est d'entreprendre des projets de reconstruction et de développement qui tiennent compte des besoins des collectivités locales.

**Perspectives :** Comme travaux à venir, en vue de l'étude à plus grande échelle, on se propose d'apporter des modifications aux scénarios actuels afin de renforcer les manipulations visant à briser la confiance. De plus, alors que l'étude pilote ne visait pas à examiner la restauration de la confiance, l'étude à plus grande échelle portera principalement sur l'évaluation des effets de la restauration de la confiance sur la confiance ultérieure. Finalement, le but de l'étude pilote et de l'étude à plus grande échelle est de mieux comprendre les bris de confiance et la restauration de la confiance entre les organisations militaires et la population locale à laquelle ces organisations viennent en aide.

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# 1 Introduction

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In recognition that successful military operations are unlikely to be achieved through military power alone, the Canadian Forces (CF) is adopting a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to operations. The comprehensive approach is derived from the “Whole of Government” perspective that addresses the importance of different agencies working in collaboration with one another to achieve greater interoperability and mission effectiveness in new and challenging operations. As a means of operationalizing the comprehensive approach, the Land Force created a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public (JIMP) capability (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). The capacity to be “JIMP-capable” is now cited by the Director of Land Concepts and Design to be an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow, and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). JIMP reflects this need for full spectrum, multipurpose forces that are capable of participating in all aspects of operations, from peacetime to combat operations. Thus, the JIMP concept articulates a perspective of operations consistent with the Government of Canada’s “Whole of Government” and 3D + C (Defence, Diplomacy, Development + Commercial) approach advanced in recent international and defence policy statements. This perspective calls for agencies and other civilian entities who have previously worked separately to work in closer collaboration as a means of achieving mission objectives (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007).

The JIMP term identifies the different players (e.g., organizations, institutions, interest groups) that are involved in the complex military operational environment (Leslie et al., 2008). Of the JIMP dimensions, the “public” aspect represents an important challenge in terms of interfacing with non-military players. The public aspect is considered to be particularly challenging as it may involve a variety of players, including domestic and international societies, media agencies, non-governmental organizations, or communities of indigenous populations existing within theatres of operations. It is the latter, local populations or indigenous publics, that is the focus of this study. Challenges associated with interfacing with host nation populations may stem, for example, from potentially significant cultural differences between the military operating in a host nation and the indigenous community of the host nation receiving military assistance. Such cultural differences, in turn, may affect the development and maintenance of trust that a local population may hold for military forces operating in their region.

As a result of the need to better understand the public aspects of JIMP, the Applied Research Project (ARP), entitled “JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander,” was developed at Defence Research and Development (DRDC) – Toronto. This pilot study supports the ARP by exploring trust violation and trust repair between military organizations and the local population the military is assisting. Recent research in the organizational psychology literature has found that in some cases (e.g., integrity-based trust violation), denial of responsibility is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. apology), whereas in other cases (e.g., competence-based trust violation), an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. denial) (Kim, Cooper, Ferrin, & Dirks, 2004). This study examined the applicability of these findings to complex international military engagements. Thus, the goal of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of trust violation and trust restoration between military organizations and the local population being assisted by military organizations in order to enhance mission success.

## **2 Trust between military organizations and the local population**

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The need to better understand the relations between military organizations and the local population being assisted has become apparent over the years, in particular since the militaries of many nations have entered complex theatres of operations, such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Africa. The lessons learned from these post-Cold war missions have indicated that traditional military approaches remain important, but are not sufficient to ensure operational success (Olson & Gregorian, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Simms, 2008). Along with establishing security, other key goals include providing humanitarian relief and development opportunities, supporting and sustaining the local population, and governance (Thompson & Gill, 2009). Local populations receiving support from (non-local) military organizations have often initially responded to such assistance with trust and support; however, over time, a decrease in trust and support has been observed, for example, as found in Afghanistan (The Senlis Council, 2007; see also van der Kloet, 2006). This shift in trust and support for military organizations may be attributed to errors, or to trust violations, made by military organizations, and may encourage the local population to direct their support to local terrorist organizations instead (The Senlis Council, 2007; van der Kloet, 2006). A lack of trust in military organizations on the part of the local population may strain the relationship between military organizations and the local population, a situation which may, in turn, jeopardize mission success and undermine the military's ability to provide support and assistance to the local population, as well as increase a volatile security situation on the ground.

Trust between military organizations and the local population they are assisting is considered to be integral to the success of international military operations. Research on interagency trust has indicated the importance of trust as key in alliance success (Jennings, Artz, Gillin, & Christodoulos, 2000). Trust is viewed as "a critical factor in alliance formation and is believed to be particularly important for success in complex environments characterized by high ambiguity and uncertainty" (Branzei, Vertinsky, & Camp, 2007, p. 153), an environment typically found in international military engagements. Trust facilitates cooperation as it enables the military to obtain necessary information from the locals regarding adversaries, and in turn, the military provides support to the local population in rebuilding their community (van der Kloet, 2006). Trust also fosters the military's ability to accomplish mission objectives, including the return of displaced people back to their homes, restoring the economy and community, and preventing terrorism. In order to increase the likelihood of collecting information from the local population, military organizations must focus on building and maintaining trust with the local community. Timely information from the local population may stop terrorist activity and reinforce trust in the military mission (van der Kloet, 2006). This type of "relationship" or trust building requires communication and cultural awareness, and it also requires more than a military defeat of insurgents to build trust (The International Council on Security and Development, 2008; van der Kloet, 2006). Indeed, "military operations are likely to be as much about gaining trust and legitimacy among the surrounding populations as engaging in armed combat and destroying adversaries" (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). The military should communicate to the local population that it is not an occupying party in the host nation with the sole purpose of removing adversaries, but that the military also aids in improving living conditions and teaching the local community how to continue rebuilding the nation when the military leaves. Further, not only

should the military indicate its purpose concerning the host nation and state its intentions, but also deliver on its promises, laying the foundation for building trust (van der Kloet, 2006).

Trust between military organizations and the local population they are assisting may be fostered in several ways, including delivering on promises and decreasing civilian casualties (The International Council on Security and Development, 2008). The importance of fulfilling promises in building trust with the local community has been demonstrated in the past; for instance, in Afghanistan a prominent issue is the production of opium. In 2006, the governor of Kandahar called a meeting of 400 community leaders, the International Security Assistance Force, and people from the national government in Kabul. The result of the meeting was the promise of modern machinery for improving the cultivation of the crop fields if farmers were to stop growing poppy, from which opium is derived. The promise of modern machinery was previously approved by ambassadors from the United Kingdom, the United States (US), and Canada, as well as by Afghan cabinet ministers. However, nothing came from this initiative due to the foreign donors failing to deliver on their promises of assistance for the machinery (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). This failed initiative resulted in the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team experiencing a “loss of face” with Afghan local leaders (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). As a result, Afghans became skeptical of such promises, experiencing distrust of those who made promises (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). In addition, the failure to deliver on many promises of a better life made to the Afghan people has been cited as contributing to insurgents’ ability to attract sympathy beyond their traditional support base and to gain political legitimacy among many Afghans (The International Council on Security and Development, 2008). The International Council on Security and Development (2008) clearly states that “the international community’s failure to give sufficient focus to the needs and desires of the Afghan population and channel them into effective policy responses is a key aspect of the insurgency’s rising popularity” (p. 15). Furthermore, an increase in civilian casualties has proven to be detrimental in winning the support and trust of the Afghan people (The Senlis Council, 2007). Consequently, despite the good intentions and technical ability of military forces, the local population who once welcomed such forces with open arms appears to be turning against them (The Senlis Council, 2007).

Recent media coverage also emphasizes the importance of gaining the trust and cooperation of the local population in order for militaries and international communities to attain their mission objectives. An interview with Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay and Brigadier General Jonathan Vance indicated that the cooperation of Afghan villages is essential to the ability of Canadians to deliver development programs, including the immunization of children and the building of schools (Tibbetts, 2009). The Defence Minister further stated that there is a “connection between our ability to deliver, and the security and the cooperation we require from local Afghans” (Tibbetts, 2009), highlighting the importance of receiving trust and cooperation from the local population to the attainment of mission goals. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Paul, who served as commander of the Task Force Kandahar, also highlights that building trust involves the CF providing jobs for the young people living in Afghanistan (The Canadian Press, 2009). The young people of Afghanistan tend to be swayed by the Taliban who give them \$50 in exchange for setting an Improvised Explosive Device, potentially shifting support for the CF to the Taliban. Indeed, US Army General Stanley A. McChrystal, the former top US military commander in Afghanistan, asserts that “if the people are against us, we cannot be successful...if the people view us as occupiers and the enemy, we can’t be successful and our casualties will go up dramatically” (Gilmore, 2009). General McChrystal notes that it was important for him to convey a message of trust and to demonstrate that he is not more valuable than the Afghan citizens (American Forces Press Service, 2009). To communicate this, General McChrystal chose

not wear body armour or carry a sidearm when visiting Afghan governors and local Afghans, as the local citizens do not wear body armour attire or carry weaponry.

Clearly, building and maintaining trust between military organizations and the local population is essential, from the military's perspective, for fostering cooperation from the local community. Furthermore, if that trust is violated, then the effective repair of the violated trust is necessary for successful military operations. While research on trust violation and trust repair in the context of military organizations assisting a local population has not been previously examined, recent research in the organizational psychology literature suggests that, in some cases (e.g., integrity-based trust violation), denial is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. apology), whereas in other cases (e.g., competence-based trust violation) an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. denial) (Kim et al., 2004). The present study examined the applicability of these findings from the organizational psychology literature to complex international military engagements.

### 3 Trust in the organizational psychology literature

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Trust is generally defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). Trust is assumed to be critical in situations that are characterized by interdependence, uncertainty, ambiguity, and risk (Mayer et al., 1995). Theorists argue that it is under these conditions that real trust occurs (e.g., Mishra, 1996). In the organizational psychology literature, the presence of trust has been found to offer numerous benefits, including the improvement of job attitudes, increased organizational commitment and performance, as well as increased cooperation (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). In the initial stages of a relationship, initial trust may be granted as an individual operates under the assumption that trust is warranted as long as there is no evidence to the contrary (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). However, a trust violation may cause trust to plunge to a level that may be below the initial trust level, representing a challenge to repairing broken trust (Kim et al., 2004). Indeed, as a result of a trust violation, individuals may be “unwilling to take risks and demand greater protection against betrayal” (Tyler & Kramer, 1996, p. 4). Consequently, the process of repairing trust may be more challenging, requiring different strategies than initial trust development (Kim et al., 2004).

The two most commonly examined trust violations in the organizational psychology literature are integrity-based and competence-based trust violations, and the two most commonly examined trust repair responses are apology and denial (Kim et al., 2004). Competence-based trust is defined as the trustor’s perception that the trustee possesses the technical and interpersonal skills required for a job (Butler & Cantrell, 1984), whereas integrity-based trust is defined as the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable (Mayer et al., 1995). An apology is defined as a statement that acknowledges both responsibility and regret for a trust violation, whereas denial is defined as a statement whereby an allegation is explicitly declared to be false; in other words, for denial, there is no assumed responsibility and hence no regret (Kim et al., 2004). Both competency and integrity represent two of the most important qualities for determining trustworthiness (Barber, 1983; Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Mayer et al., 1995; Schindler & Thomas, 1993). In determining which trust repair response (e.g., apology or denial) is most effective for trust restoration, it depends upon the type of trust violation (e.g., competence vs. integrity). For instance, Kim et al. (2004) examined the implications of an apology versus denial for repairing trust after a competence and integrity trust violation. They found that trust was repaired more successfully when mistrusted parties apologized for violations concerning competence and denied responsibility for violations concerning integrity. Kim et al. (2004) suggest that an apology is more effective for a competence trust violation as individuals tend to weigh positive information regarding competence more heavily than negative information, suggesting that it may be more effective to apologize rather than deny culpability for a competence-based trust violation. The apology does indeed confirm that the violation was committed; however, the competence violation may be considered an anomaly that would not be repeated in the future. Kim et al. (2004) suggest that the admission of guilt from an apology may be less significant than its positive effect on trust, as the admission of guilt indicates that the violation would not happen again in the future, salvaging subsequent trust. In contrast, denial is more effective for an integrity violation as individuals tend to weigh negative information about integrity more heavily than positive information. Individuals may believe that those with high integrity will refrain from dishonest behavior, and those with low

integrity may exhibit dishonest behavior. Consequently, denial limits perceived guilt, and repeating the infraction in the future is not an issue as it was denied in the first place. Apologizing for the integrity violation would be less effective than denying the violation, as the apology would confirm guilt and lack of integrity and would have a negative effect on subsequent trust, whereas denying the perceived integrity violation would salvage subsequent trust.

Taking this research a step further, researchers examined the effects of trust repair mechanisms, including apology, denial, and reticence, on competence and integrity-based trust violations (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). Similar findings were observed, in that trust was repaired more successfully when mistrusted parties apologized for violations concerning competence but denied responsibility for violations concerning integrity. Reticence (e.g., when an accused party does not confirm or disconfirm the veracity of an allegation) was found to be a suboptimal response to integrity- and competence-based trust violations in terms of repairing trust. While this research has been conducted within the context of organizational psychology and is in its infancy, it also provides a starting point for the exploration of trust violation and trust repair mechanisms in the context of complex international military engagements.

## **4 Purpose of Pilot Study**

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The primary focus of this pilot study was to determine the effectiveness of the trust violation and trust repair manipulations, and to assess participants' initial baseline level of trust and whether or not allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate that trust. By establishing initial levels of trust, we could establish that there was trust to be violated. A secondary purpose was to examine participants' qualitative responses regarding how trust can be restored between the local population and the military organization providing assistance. Methodologically, this was a scenario-based study conducted with civilian members of DRDC Toronto, and local community members of Toronto, namely York University students. The goal of this research is to gain insight into the nature of trust violations and trust repair mechanisms between military organizations, such as the CF, and the local population being assisted, and to determine which types of trust violations and trust repair responses are optimal for restoring trust in this context. Thus, this pilot study, and the subsequent larger research study, aims to provide information on how to repair trust violations effectively between military organizations and the local population being assisted.

## 5 Method

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### 5.1 Participants

This pilot study was conducted with 50<sup>1</sup> participants (21 male, 29 female, Mean age in years = 28.84,  $SD = 11.10$ ). The majority of participants were White ( $n = 29$ , 58%), while the remainder of the sample was of Chinese ( $n = 8$ , 16%), South Asian ( $n = 6$ , 12%), Black ( $n = 2$ , 4%), Filipino ( $n = 2$ , 4%), Southeast Asian ( $n = 2$ , 4%), and Aboriginal ( $n = 1$ , 2%) descent. A large majority of participants were born in Canada ( $n = 31$ , 62%), while the remainder was born in China, the US, Guyana, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Serbia, Singapore, Korea, India, Ukraine, Russia, or Romania (1 or 2 participants were born in each of these countries). The mean number of years that participants resided in Canada was 23.26 ( $SD = 11.41$ ).

Participants included undergraduate students from York University and civilian participants from DRDC Toronto. Military participants were excluded as the focus of this study was to examine the perceptions of people who were taking the perspective of the local civilian population of an assisted country, rather than a military population. Military participants would provide a different perspective that would include their experiences and beliefs as military members and these may be significantly different from those of a member of the local population, or civilian participants, which may add a significant amount of variability to responses. In order to generalize the results of this study to a local civilian population, the sample would need to reflect the characteristics of the local civilian population. Participants from York University were recruited through the Psychology Department's Undergraduate Research Participant Pool (URPP) and through a Call for Subjects poster that was posted on the York University campus (see Annex A). Participants from DRDC Toronto were recruited with the aid of an all-user's e-mail containing the same Call for Subjects poster as an attachment. The methodology and questionnaires were reviewed and approved by the DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) and all participants received remuneration according to DRDC guidelines.

### 5.2 Experimental Procedure

Methodologically, this is a scenario-based study. Participants were randomly assigned to each experimental condition (see Figure 1). Participants were run individually at DRDC Toronto and were seated in a room with a computer. The experiment was conducted on the computer, using a computer software program called MediaLab (Empirisoft, New York), which directed participants to the appropriate task. Only the researcher and participant had access to the room to ensure the privacy of his/her responses. All participants were given an Information Letter describing the study (see Annex B). Participants were requested to complete all materials on the computer, excluding the Voluntary Consent Form, which was completed on paper (see Annex C-1 for DRDC participants and Annex C-2 for participants outside of DRDC). All remaining materials were read and completed on the computer, including the Biographical Data Form (see Annex D), the scenario (see Annex E1, E2, and E3), the questionnaires (see Annex F), and the Debriefing Form (see Annex G). The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour. In order to protect

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<sup>1</sup> A power analysis indicated that a total of 50 participants has 56% power for detecting a medium sized effect of .50 (Cohen, 1988) when employing the .05 criterion for statistical significance (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).



the confidentiality and anonymity of participants the Voluntary Consent Forms were stored separately from the research data.

Participants were told that the study assessed perceptions of the relationship between military organizations and the local population being assisted, using a scenario in which the participants imagined themselves as a local citizen of a fictional country. The scenario consisted of a situation in which a fictional country, Safia, was experiencing conflict due to the rising power of a local terrorist organization. An initial scenario section provided a historical background to the fictional country of Safia, including a summary of the issues related to the current conflict within the country, as well as background into the government of Massey (another fictional country) which offered their military to assist Safia in dealing with the terrorist threat and re-building the country, specifically by providing improved health care and road/travel conditions, an educational system, and political infrastructure. Baseline measures assessing expectations concerning the Massey military, perceptions of their competence, benevolence and integrity, and trust intentions regarding the Massey military (see Figure 2 for design overview) were then completed. Following from Kim et al's (2004) methodology, participants then read a second portion of the scenario that involved a competency-based trust violation, an integrity-based trust violation, or no trust violation (control). Participants were randomly assigned to a trust violation (competency vs. integrity), trust repair (denial vs. apology) or control condition (see Figure 1). The competence trust violation was constructed to indicate that the Massey military was unable fulfil their mandate to provide basic resources and security to the local population due to their lack of knowledge/technical skills (see Butler & Cantrell, 1984), while the integrity trust violation was constructed to indicate that the Massey military failed to live up to their promises to provide security and resources because they appeared to be dishonest and self-serving (Mayer et al., 1995). In the control condition no trust violation was committed. Participants next completed a second set of dependent measures identical to the first, with the addition of items assessing their willingness to risk their future to the Massey military.

The next portion of the scenario contained the trust repair manipulation based on the Massey military's response to criticisms of their activities. In the apology repair condition, the Massey military admitted that mistakes had been made, took responsibility for the errors to date, admitted their culpability to date and promised to correct the errors in the future. In the denial repair condition the Massey military largely denied any responsibility for not delivering on their mandate within Safia – indeed they suggested that the criticism was largely political manoeuvring on the part of the Safian government. The control condition included no trust repair manipulation as no trust violation had been committed. A third set of dependent measures identical to the second questionnaire administration was then completed in order to assess trust levels after the repair manipulation. Finally, participants provided short-answer recommendations concerning what they considered to be optimal trust repair strategies for this context, as well as manipulation checks.

Figure 1: Trust Study Conditions

|                       |         | Trust Violation |           | Control                                       |
|-----------------------|---------|-----------------|-----------|---|
|                       |         | Competence      | Integrity | (i.e. No Trust Violation, No Repair Strategy) |
| Trust Repair Strategy | Apology | n=10            | n=10      |   |
|                       | Denial  | n=10            | n=10      | n=10  |

Figure 2: Design Overview

| Scenario Introduction   | Baseline Measures   | Trust Violation Manipulation  | Post-Violation Measures   | Trust Repair Manipulation   | Post-Repair Measures  | Post Scenario Measures  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Country history, background to current conflict and request by Safian Government for Massey military assistance | <p>a. Expectations of the Massey military</p> <p>b. Trust of Massey military: (perceived competence, integrity, benevolence)</p> <p>c. Trust intentions toward military</p> | <p>Integrity</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>Competence</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>Control</p> | <p>a. Expectations of the Massey military</p> <p>b. Trust of Massey military: (perceived competence, integrity, benevolence)</p> <p>c. Trust intentions toward Massey military</p> <p>d. Willingness to risk aspects of future on Massey military</p> | <p>Apology</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>Denial</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>Control</p> | <p>a. Expectations of the Massey military</p> <p>b. Trust of Massey military: (perceived competence, integrity, benevolence)</p> <p>c. Trust intentions toward Massey military</p> <p>d. Willingness to risk aspects of future on Massey military</p> | <p>a. Trust repair recommendations (short answer)</p> <p>b. Manipulation checks</p> |

Participants completed several questionnaires, including manipulation checks (Kim et al., 2004) (see Annex F), trust beliefs and trust intentions (Mayer & Davis, 1999) (see Annex F), and two open-ended items assessing how the military could restore the trust of the local population and identification of Safia as a real country (see Annex F). Upon completion of the study, participants were given the debriefing form (see Annex G).

### 5.3 Measures<sup>2</sup>

*Trust Dimensions.* A total of 17 items adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999) reflected the three most prominent trust dimensions. Reliabilities were all excellent (competence, 6 items: e.g., “The Massey military are very capable of performing their job,” baseline  $\alpha = .86$ ; post violation  $\alpha = .93$ ; post repair  $\alpha = .93$ ; benevolence, 5 items: e.g., “The Massey military are very concerned about the welfare of Safians,” baseline  $\alpha = .82$ ; post violation  $\alpha = .93$ ; post repair  $\alpha = .96$ ; integrity, 6 items: e.g., “The Massey military has a strong sense of justice,” baseline  $\alpha = .84$ ; post violation  $\alpha = .92$ ; post repair  $\alpha = .93$ ). All questions were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) (see Annex F).

*Trust Intentions.* Four items assessed participants’ propensity to trust the military (e.g., “I would let the Massey military continue to have influence over issues that are important to me for the duration of their mission here,” adapted from Mayer & Davis, 1999). This measure, administered three times, also had excellent reliabilities: baseline  $\alpha = .81$ , post trust violation  $\alpha = .91$ , and post repair  $\alpha = .90$ . All questions were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) (see Annex F).

*Manipulation Checks.* Participants answered 3 multiple-choice questions administered at the end of the study that assessed whether they recognized the nature of the violation (competence vs. integrity – 2 items) and the response to the violation (apology vs. denial – 1 item) (Kim et al., 2004) (see Annex F).

*Open-ended Trust Repair Strategy.* All participants were asked the following open-end questions: “As a local member of Safia, in order to gain your trust, what would you have liked the Massey military to have said or done?” and “If Safia were a real country what country do you think it would be?”

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<sup>2</sup> Three other measures were included in the questionnaire package for exploratory purposes. However, the measures were not included in this report as the focus of the pilot study was to establish the effectiveness of the manipulations and shift in trust from baseline to post violation, and to examine participants’ qualitative responses regarding restoring trust. All measures will be examined in the larger research study.

## 6 Results

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As indicated earlier, the focus of this pilot study was to determine the effectiveness of the trust violation and trust repair manipulations and to assess participants' initial baseline level of trust and whether or not allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate that trust, as well as to examine participants' qualitative responses regarding how trust can be restored between the local population and the military organization providing assistance. Thus, the analyses presented in the following section focus on addressing these questions.

### 6.1 Manipulation Checks

Participants responded to three manipulation check questions that assessed whether they recognized the nature of the violation (competence vs. integrity) and the response to the violation (apology vs. denial). A series of frequency analyses using cross-tabulation were conducted to assess the percentage of participants that correctly answered the manipulation check questions.

For the trust violation manipulation check, two questions were asked. For the first question ("In the scenario, the Massey military was accused of being unable to defeat the insurgency and improve conditions of Safia due to..."), 60% of the participants in the competence trust violation condition correctly identified the nature of the violation (i.e., correctly responded that it was a competence violation), 40% of the participants in the integrity trust violation condition correctly identified the nature of the violation (i.e., correctly responded that it was an integrity violation), and 70% of the participants in the control condition answered the nature of the trust violation correctly (i.e., correctly responded that there was no trust violation).

For the second trust violation manipulation check question ("What does this accusation bring into question"), 70% of the participants in the competence trust violation condition correctly identified the nature of the violation, 55% of the participants in the integrity trust violation condition correctly identified the nature of the violation, and 60% of the participants in the control condition answered the nature of the trust violation question correctly. Results of these manipulation checks suggested that some adjustments need to be made to the scenarios to make clearer to the participants the nature of the trust violation.

For the trust repair manipulation check, one question was asked ("What was the Massey military's response to the accusation?"). For this question, 90% of the participants in the apology condition correctly identified the trust repair mechanism (i.e., apology), 90% of the participants in the denial condition correctly identified the trust repair mechanism (i.e., denial), and 90% of participants in the control condition correctly answered the question (i.e., indicated that no trust repair mechanism was used, as no trust violation had occurred). Results of this manipulation check suggested that no changes need to be made to the trust repair manipulation.

Results of the manipulation checks indicate that in order to achieve a higher percentage of accurate identification of the competence and integrity trust violation manipulations for the future larger study, adjustments will need to be made to the scenarios. These adjustments will consist of making the nature of the trust violations clearer; for instance, isolating the competence trust violation to consist solely of a competence violation, rather than being diluted with a trust

violation that may be perceived by participants as an integrity (or control) violation. Similar adjustments will need to be made to the integrity violation scenario.

## 6.2 Trust Dimensions and Trust Intentions

In order to assess participants' initial baseline level of trust and whether or not allegations of untrustworthy behavior would be sufficient to violate that trust, trust measured at baseline and post trust violation was evaluated. A series of paired t-tests were conducted to evaluate the impact of the trust violations on trust dimensions, including perceived competence, perceived integrity, and perceived benevolence, as well as trust intentions<sup>3</sup>. In order to determine that initial trust can be violated, a decrease in trust from baseline to post trust violation needs to occur.

For participants who experienced the competence trust violation, significant differences were observed for perceived competence ( $t(19) = 8.77, p < .001, \eta^2 = .80$ ), benevolence ( $t(19) = 7.53, p < .001, \eta^2 = .74$ ), integrity ( $t(19) = 5.80, p < .001, \eta^2 = .64$ ), and trust intentions ( $t(19) = 6.36, p < .001, \eta^2 = .68$ ) suggesting that there was a significant decrease in trust from baseline to post violation (see Table 1).

For participants who experienced the integrity trust violation, significant differences were observed for perceived competence ( $t(19) = 9.25, p < .001, \eta^2 = .82$ ), benevolence ( $t(19) = 5.99, p < .001, \eta^2 = .65$ ), integrity ( $t(19) = 5.39, p < .001, \eta^2 = .60$ ), and trust intentions ( $t(19) = 4.24, p < .001, \eta^2 = .48$ ) suggesting that there was a significant decrease in trust from baseline to post violation (see Table 1).

For participants who were in the control condition for trust violation, significant differences were observed only for integrity ( $t(9) = -4.21, p < .05, \eta^2 = .66$ ), and trust intentions ( $t(9) = -4.65, p < .05, \eta^2 = .70$ ), indicating an increase in trust, whereas no significant changes in trust were found for measures of perceived competence ( $t(9) = -1.85, p > .05$ ) and benevolence ( $t(9) = -3.08, p > .05$ ) (see Table 1).

Overall, consistent with expectations, initial trust (baseline trust) was higher than trust assessed post violation for the competence and integrity trust violation manipulations, indicating that allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate initial trust. Indeed, decreases in trust were observed across all trust measures, including the three trust dimensions (perceived competence, integrity, and benevolence) and trust intentions, regardless of the trust violation condition. For instance, in the competence trust violation condition, a decrease in trust was observed not only for the competence trust dimension, but also for the integrity and benevolence trust dimensions. Likewise, for the integrity trust violation condition, a decrease in trust was observed not only for the integrity trust dimension, but also for the competence and benevolence trust dimensions.

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<sup>3</sup> To minimize Type I errors, the Bonferroni adjustment was applied to all analyses to maintain a family-wise error rate of .05.

*Table 1: Means and standard deviations (SDs) of trust dimensions (perceived competence, integrity, benevolence) and trust intentions by trust violations*

|                       | Trust Violations  |        |                   |        |                   |        |
|-----------------------|-------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|
|                       | Competence        |        | Integrity         |        | Control           |        |
|                       | Mean              | (SD)   | Mean              | (SD)   | Mean              | (SD)   |
| Perceived Competence  |                   |        |                   |        |                   |        |
| Baseline              | 4.86 <sup>a</sup> | (0.96) | 5.51 <sup>a</sup> | (0.61) | 4.58              | (1.16) |
| Post violation        | 2.29 <sup>b</sup> | (0.96) | 3.34 <sup>b</sup> | (1.04) | 5.25              | (0.87) |
| Perceived Benevolence |                   |        |                   |        |                   |        |
| Baseline              | 4.41 <sup>a</sup> | (1.01) | 4.11 <sup>a</sup> | (0.94) | 4.02              | (1.06) |
| Post-violation        | 2.47 <sup>b</sup> | (0.87) | 2.41 <sup>b</sup> | (1.15) | 5.16              | (1.19) |
| Perceived Integrity   |                   |        |                   |        |                   |        |
| Baseline              | 4.27 <sup>a</sup> | (0.94) | 4.18 <sup>a</sup> | (0.93) | 4.11 <sup>a</sup> | (0.91) |
| Post-violation        | 2.63 <sup>b</sup> | (0.93) | 2.75 <sup>b</sup> | (1.01) | 5.23 <sup>b</sup> | (0.74) |
| Trust Intentions      |                   |        |                   |        |                   |        |
| Baseline              | 3.58 <sup>a</sup> | (0.91) | 4.03 <sup>a</sup> | (1.06) | 3.30 <sup>a</sup> | (1.14) |
| Post-violation        | 1.95 <sup>b</sup> | (0.91) | 2.68 <sup>b</sup> | (1.20) | 4.90 <sup>b</sup> | (1.16) |

Note: Superscripts denote significant differences in a given column at  $p < .05$ .

### 6.3 Open-Ended Questions

All participants were asked 2 open-ended questions, namely: “As a local member of Safia, in order to gain your trust, what would you have liked the Massey military to have said or done?” and “If Safia were a real country what country do you think it would be?”<sup>4</sup>.

The first question was analyzed using NVivo8 (QSR International’s NVivo8, 2008), a qualitative research data-analytic software package. NVivo8 was used to identify and categorize themes and issues pertaining to trust restoration. For the second question, given that responses consisted of the name of a country or general region in the world, a frequency analysis using cross-tabulation was conducted.

Two researchers first independently read all responses and identified a list of recurring topics and themes, following an inductive approach that “allows categories to emerge from the data, rather than imposing them through theory or research driven hypothesis” (Bond, Holmes, Byrne, Babchuk, & Kirton-Robbins, 2008). The researchers shared their themes and came to a consensus for a coding scheme. Fourteen main themes were identified. Inter-rater reliability, or the overall mean kappa, was calculated. Kappa values can range from zero, representing no agreement beyond chance, to one, representing perfect agreement. Negative kappa values are possible but are unusual in practice. Kappa values of 0.80 or higher are considered to be an excellent level of agreement (Daly & Bourke, 2000). Initial inter-rater reliability between the two researchers was found to be strong, with a mean kappa of 0.94. As a result, further discussion to reach consensus of agreement was not needed.

Several dominant themes emerged from participants’ responses with respect to what they would have liked the Massey military to have done to gain the trust of the local population (see Table 2). The most prevalent theme, expressed by 19 of 50 or the majority (38%) of participants, concerned the need for the Massey military to have more effective communication with the local population and to include the local population in their work. In addition, many participants indicated that they would have liked the Massey military to take responsibility for their actions (22%); that they would have liked the Massey military to have provided a timeline or a plan of action with respect to what the Massey military would do (20%); and that they would have liked the Massey military to demonstrate greater concern for the local population (20%), to fulfill their promises (18%), and to resolve the cocoa leaf crop issue (18%) (see next page).

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<sup>4</sup> Responses were analyzed collapsing across all experimental conditions as preliminary analyses had revealed no distinct pattern across conditions. The control condition was included in analyses as participants provided valuable recommendations regarding trust restoration despite not experiencing a trust violation.

*Table 2: Frequency of themes based on total number of participants*

| Themes  | Frequency | Percentages |
|---|-----------|-------------|
| More effective communication with locals/include locals in work | 19        | 38          |
| Take responsibility   | 11        | 22          |
| Demonstrate greater concern for locals                          | 10        | 20          |
| Timeline/plan of action   | 10        | 20          |
| Resolve cocoa leaf issue  | 9         | 18          |
| Fulfill promises  | 9         | 18          |
| United Nations intervene  | 4         | 8           |
| Reassurance   | 4         | 8           |
| Avoid civilian casualties                                       | 3         | 6           |
| Get rid of terrorists   | 3         | 6           |
| Apology not enough  | 3         | 6           |
| Focus on development and reconstruction                         | 2         | 6           |
| Leave Safia   | 2         | 6           |
| Focus on rural population                                       | 1         | 2           |

For instance, several participants commented that they would have expected a detailed explanation of what the problems are and a plan to overcome the problems, along with specific steps to work with the Safian government on issues to ensure that the Safian issues are addressed. In addition, several participants indicated that they would have wanted to “see some kind of a proposal or a coherent plan for how infractions are going to be addressed, and how the Massey military intend to progress from this point on in rebuilding my country [Safia] and establishing a stable government.” One participant also stated that “the Massey military should declare deadline dates for the improvements, [that] if not met then all trust is lost.” In addition, several participants commented on the need for the Massey military to take responsibility for their actions to increase their (i.e., participants’) trust, as well as on the need for the Massey military to demonstrate greater concern for the local population by showing greater interest in the local population’s health and life conditions. Similarly, several participants commented on the need for the military to share their resources so that everyone is living in the same conditions, and on the need for the military to pay more attention to the local population’s overall needs. One participant suggested that the “Massey military help improve the economy of Safia, and provide more training and jobs to local citizens in Safia” as a way of gaining his/her trust, while another indicated that the



military should “focus on improving the life of the local people...help them farm the land and improve food resources.” Another participant further indicated that his/her trust could be gained if the Massey military would “set up safe houses, shelters, or services that addressed the needs of residents [and] imported services that would strengthen Safia, i.e. literacy, skills, [and] knowledge.”

Consistent with previous research (Olson & Gregorian, 2007; van der Kloet, 2006), a key theme that emerged from this study was the importance of fulfilling promises as a means of increasing participants’ trust in the military. Several participants said that they would have liked the Massey military to do what they had promised to do. One participant said that “if the conditions in Safia proved more difficult and/or complex than originally anticipated and this led to the Massey military being unable to produce the results that they originally said that they would produce, I would expect a detailed explanation of what the problems are and a plan to overcome the problems, with new projections of what can be done to help the Safians.” Indeed, several other participants clearly stated that the military should have “stuck to their word” and “kept their promise of protecting Safians,” while another stated that “trust can not be gained until they fulfill their promises.”

In addition to the Massey military engaging in the above activities in order to gain trust from the local population, the analysis also indicated that several participants had concerns regarding the cocoa leaf crop issue. For instance, one participant understood that eliminating the cocoa leaf crop would take away Safia’s largest resource and income for Safians, despite its use by the terrorists to manufacture cocaine. This participant stated that the military should have kept the needs of the local people in mind before eliminating the “cash crop.” Indeed, another participant stated that the military needed to “become more aware of the concerns of the Safians as a whole. I think it was a big mistake that they sought out to eradicate their main agricultural source of income because terrorists were also using it for drugs...I think capital is one of the most valuable assets in trying to repair an already war-torn country. The Massey military lacked proper research before acting.” Another participant echoed this comment by stating that the military should “not place a ban on cocoa leaves because it is being misused, rather [they should] find a way for legitimate farmers to continue their growing while keeping an eye on the exploited growers.” Several other participants echoed this sentiment, stating that the cocoa leaf crop should not be eradicated as it is central to the local population’s income. Notably, one participant who was in the control condition (where the military was found to protect the cocoa leaf crops) stated that the military “have demonstrated that by protecting the cocoa crops that they are truly interested in my welfare.” This statement suggests that protecting what is viewed to be important to the local population may be key in maintaining or repairing trust.

With respect to improving communication with the local population as a way of improving trust, several participants suggested that the military clearly define to the local population their plan of action so as to ensure transparency of actions and no misinterpretation for a hidden agenda. For instance, several participants stated that they would have liked the military “to have admitted that they were mostly responsible for the lack of progress [and] to have reassessed in co-operation with the Safian government what needs to be done for Safians.” Similarly, another participant indicated that the military should consult the local population before implementing any initiatives as a means of improving trust between the two groups, and frequently seek out the advice and perspective of the local population to determine what the locals require in order to improve conditions.

In addition, participants also suggested that the military include and collaborate with the local population in the redevelopment and rebuilding of Safia as a way of increasing trust. For instance, one participant stated that by “having Safians work hand in hand with the military to build the roads and pay [Safians] financially, the economy and Safian self pride will be boosted.” Several participants suggested that if the military were to provide jobs and training for the locals, then the economy would improve and trust in the military would increase.

Several other themes were centered on the importance of avoiding civilian casualties, getting rid of terrorists, letting the United Nations intervene, and providing reassurance to the local population. In terms of getting rid of terrorists, one participant stated that “getting rid of the terrorists should be the military’s first priority. Rebuilding the land would be pretty useless if there are still competing rulers because fights are bound to break out until one power dominates.” Several participants also commented on the need for the military to allow the United Nations to intervene; participants believed that it would be useful to “bring in specialized groups from [the] United Nations to help introduce a new resource, be it a type of crop for farming or a new mining industry, to bring in a different financial addition to the country that might give the Safians renewed hope.” Some participants also commented on the need for the military to communicate more frequently with the United Nations (UN) in order to for the UN to provide more resources and materials for the locals if the military cannot provide these resources. Several participants also commented on the need for the Massey military to provide reassurance to the local population as a means of promoting trust, for instance, by providing constant reassurance of the military’s protection and security of the Safians’ welfare and reassurance that Safia will be protected at all costs. One participant stated that “the locals need reassurance quite often from the Massey military in order to have the trust of the locals.”

Finally, although lower in frequency, participants also indicated that an apology is not enough to gain back trust, and that the military should not only apologize, but also should “include an outline of how they [the military] were going to solve problems; this would increase the level of trust of the Safians in the Massey military.” In addition, participants also commented on how the military should focus more on development and reconstruction, and less on combat and counterinsurgency as a way of improving trust. One participant also indicated that the main focus of the military should have been on the rural population where Safians have little or no literacy as this is the population that is “easily swayed by terrorists and perhaps [is] supporting their cause because of poor knowledge and severe poverty.”

Participants were also asked, “If Safia were a real country what country do you think it would be?” To assess responses, a frequency analysis using cross-tabulation was conducted. The analysis revealed that the majority of participants perceived Safia to be Afghanistan ( $n = 33$ , 66%), while others perceived Safia to be Iraq ( $n = 6$ , 12%), Africa ( $n = 5$ , 10%), the Middle East ( $n = 5$ , 10%), or Somalia ( $n = 3$ , 6%), with the remainder believing Safia to be Nigeria, Haiti, Rwanda, Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, South America, Southeast Asia, or Central America. Although Safia is a fictional country, its description was based on certain features of war-torn countries, such as Afghanistan, which have faced poverty, social, political, and economic upheaval, damage to infrastructure, and so on. Thus, this perception of Safia as being Afghanistan suggests a component of realism to the study, rather than perceiving Safia as an artificial country with no real-life relevance.

## **7 Conclusion**

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### **7.1 Manipulation Checks**

Based on the results of the manipulation checks for trust violation, it appears that adjustments need to be made to the scenarios for the subsequent larger study. These adjustments consist of making the nature of the trust violations clearer; for instance, isolating the competence trust violation to consist solely of a competence violation, rather than being diluted with a trust violation that may be perceived by participants as an integrity violation (or control). Similar adjustments are to be made to the integrity violation scenario. In contrast, based on the results of the manipulation checks for trust repair, it appears that no changes need to be made to the trust repair manipulations.

### **7.2 Initial Baseline Trust**

In terms of assessing participants' initial baseline level of trust and whether or not allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate that trust, results indicated that, consistent with expectations, initial (baseline) trust was significantly higher than trust assessed post violation for the competence and integrity trust violation conditions, indicating that allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate initial trust. However, it is also worth noting that decreases in trust were observed not just for the specific trust dimension involved, but also for other trust dimensions. This suggests that violations of trust based on one trust dimension (competence or integrity) may generalize to other trust dimensions, as well.

### **7.3 Open-Ended Questions**

The responses to the open-ended items provide an indication of what participants, imagining themselves as local Safians, believed that the military needs to do to gain and restore the trust of the local Safian population. Several themes emerged from the data suggesting a range of behaviors that the military may engage in to restore trust. Some of the dominant themes included the importance of the military devising a timeline or a plan of action with respect to what the Massey military would do; taking responsibility for their actions; demonstrating greater concern for the local population; fulfilling their promises; and resolving the cocoa leaf crop issue so important to the economic livelihood of the Safian people. However, by far the most prevalent theme, mentioned by a majority of participants, concerned the need for the Massey military to have more effective communication with the locals and to include the locals in their work. Indeed, the focus, according to participants, should be on the local civilians, and spending more time with them. Such findings are consistent with previous research that suggests that one strategy for combating mistrust of the military amongst civilians is for the military to engage in reconstruction and development projects that take into account local community needs. Iribarnegaray (2002) has argued that the long-term success of such projects is dependent on community involvement, as consultants, planners, and co-reconstructors. By embracing community input, the military can be sure that these projects fit the needs of the community, have cultural relevance, and engender a sense of ownership and autonomy (Iribarnegaray, 2002).

Furthermore, the participants highlighted the importance of including the locals in the work of the military as a means of restoring trust, which is consistent with the views of senior military officers. General McChrystal believes that mission objectives have a greater chance of being achieved if stability in the local government is promoted and the confidence of the local population is won (CBC News, 2009). The present findings are also consistent with current reports of increased trust and cooperation between the Afghan population and the CF. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul states that the Taliban were reportedly having difficulty conscripting local help because the young people were already busy helping the coalition with development and reconstruction projects (The Canadian Press, 2009). Also consistent with participants' comments about fulfilling promises is Lieutenant Colonel Paul's statements regarding how the CF have to do more than talk about helping the locals open schools and clinics; they must also deliver on these objectives. Evidently, several suggestions made by the participants in this study overlap with the current view of the CF in terms of restoring trust and cooperation between the military and the local population. The subsequent larger study will further explore trust violation and trust restoration between military organizations and the local population being assisted by military organizations, focusing on the effects of trust restoration on subsequent trust.

In addition, the questions assessing participants' perception of what country Safia could be suggests a component of realism in the study. Rather than perceiving Safia as an artificial country with no real-life relevance, a majority of participants associated Safia with Afghanistan. Although Safia is a fictional country, its description was based on certain features of war-torn countries, such as Afghanistan, which have faced poverty, social, political, and economic upheaval, damage to infrastructure, and so on. Thus, this perception of Safia as being Afghanistan suggests a component of realism in the study.

## 8 Concluding Remarks

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As this study is one of the first to employ a scenario-based experimental approach to explore trust within the context of international military missions, the current study, while valuable, does have some limitations. Although we took care to develop trust violations and repair scenarios that were based on factual incidents from a variety of recent missions, the results of the manipulation checks indicated some confusion concerning experimental condition assignment, in particular within the integrity trust violation condition, which needs to be edited for the subsequent larger study. In addition, the scenario-based design means that these elements are not comparable to real-life experiences of living within a war-torn country. The latter involves intense and chronic stress and grave consequences, as well as a lack of resources to survive. In the current study, participants provided their responses without the emotional surround of these factors; although asked to imagine themselves as members of the local population and react accordingly, the actual negative consequences of experiencing the trust violations and trust repair strategies were minimal at best and did not extend beyond the laboratory or session. In addition, the study would have been strengthened with the use of a larger number of respondents. However, studies with low sample size and power are typical in studies that are exploratory, such as the current study, potentially providing fruitful avenues for future research (Sturgis, 2006). Nonetheless, despite a relatively small sample size and low statistical power, the presence of significant results and moderate effect sizes suggests robust findings. Given the limitations and preliminary status of this pilot study, the results presented here are not intended to provide a basis for implementing any policies or procedures at this stage. Rather, the results of the pilot study will be used to make adjustments to strengthen the manipulations for the subsequent larger study.

Notably, a distinct advantage of studying trust in an experimental context is the direct manipulation of variables and examination of cause and effect associations, in the context of the control provided within laboratory conditions. Thus, despite the preliminary and exploratory nature of this pilot study, this research provides a starting point for the exploration of trust violations and restoration within the context of international military missions.

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## **Annex A Call for Participants Poster/Email**

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Title of Experiment: Understanding the relationship between military organizations and a local population: A Pilot Study

Purpose of Experiment: To increase understanding of the current relationship between military organizations and the local population they are assisting.

Procedure:

You will be asked to read a scenario and complete self-report questionnaires assessing your perceptions of the scenario. All tasks will be completed on a computer.

Types of Participants Requested:

We are recruiting civilian female and male participants. Participants must be 18 years of age or older. Only civilian participants are included as the focus of this study is to examine the local civilian population of an assisted country, rather than a military population.

Location of Experiments:

DRDC Toronto

Invasive Procedures and Non-Invasive Measures Required:

No invasive or non-invasive measures will be required for this study.

Duration of Participant Participation:

The experiment will last 1 hour.

Risks to Participant:

This is an acceptable risk study. The anticipated physical, social, psychological, emotional, or other risks associated with this experiment are minimal (e.g., minor eye strain).

Benefits:

The potential benefits of this pilot study include gaining insight into one's perceptions of the relationship between a military organization and the local population they are assisting, as well as insight into the nature of complex security environments.

Compensation:

Stress remuneration will be provided according to Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) guidelines.

Point of Contact:

Dr. Ritu Gill, Defence Scientist ([Ritu.Gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:Ritu.Gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca) or 416-635-3002)

Dr. Angela Febbraro, Defence Scientist, ([Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca) or 416-635-3120)

Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence Scientist ([Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca) or 416-635-2040)

## Annex B Information Letter

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Dear Participant:

You are being asked to participate in a study exploring perceptions of the relationship between military organizations and the local population they are assisting. The purpose of this study, entitled, “Understanding the relationship between military organizations and a local population: A Pilot Study” is to increase our understanding of the current relationship between military organizations and the local population being assisted.

As you may be aware, the need to better understand the relationship between military organizations and the local population being assisted has become apparent over the years. Local populations receiving support from non-local military organizations have initially responded positively to such assistance; however, over time, the relationship has at times been noted to change. The purpose of the present study is to examine how the relationship between these two groups may shift and what mechanisms are optimal to address such changes. Ultimately the goal of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between military organizations and the local population being assisted.

To assist in this study, you are being asked for approximately 1 hour of your time. You will be asked a number of biographical questions. You will also be asked to imagine that you are a member of the local population of a war-torn country and will be presented with a written description of recent conditions in the country. At different points in the scenario you will be asked to respond to questions that assess a variety of your perceptions *as a member of the local population*. The study will be conducted in a laboratory room on a computer at Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) – Toronto. Only you and the researcher will have access to the room to ensure the privacy of your responses.

We recognize that participating in this study takes up your time. Although we cannot pay you for your time, we are able to give you a small remuneration as authorized by the Department of National Defence.

The information that you provide in the study is strictly confidential. With your consent, all data will be kept in a secure location accessible only to the researchers involved with this or ensuing projects. The same consideration will apply should you grant permission for the secondary use of data, and at no time will the content of your responses be made available to anyone outside of the subsequent research team(s). Your informed consent will be kept separately from your data, which will be identified via an anonymous subject code.

The risks associated with your participation in this study are minimal (e.g., minor eye strain), and are anticipated to be no greater than what you would encounter in your daily life or occupation. If, however, the topic/questions make you feel uncomfortable, you should feel free to decline to answer. Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. If you withdraw from the study your data will be destroyed, or however you wish to handle the data in this case.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please complete the attached Voluntary Consent Form. The Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) has approved this study (L-701A).

If you have any questions please feel free to contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Ritu Gill.

Sincerely,

Dr. Ritu M. Gill  
DRDC Toronto  
1133 Sheppard Avenue West  
P.O. Box 2000  
Toronto, Ontario  
M3M 3B9  
Tel: (416) 635-2000, Ext. 3002  
Fax: (416) 635-2191  
E-mail:  
[Ritu.Gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:Ritu.Gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)

## Annex C

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### C.1 Voluntary Consent Form (DRDC Participants Only)

**Protocol Number: L-701A**

**Title:** Understanding the Relationship between Military Organizations and a Local Population: A Pilot Study

**Principal Investigator:** Dr. Ritu M. Gill, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto

**Co-Investigators:** Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Ms. Marissa Barnes, York University

**Thrust:** 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander (Applied Research Project in Land Command Thrust, PG2)

I \_\_\_\_\_ (name) of \_\_\_\_\_ (address and phone number) hereby volunteer to participate as a participant in the study “Understanding the relationship between military organizations and a local population: A Pilot Study” (Protocol L-701A). I have read the Information Letter, and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Principal Investigator. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research project and have any questions about this study answered by contacting Dr. Ritu M. Gill at 416-635-2000 Extension 3002, or Dr. Jack Landolt at 416-635-2000 Extension 2120.

I have been told that I will be asked to participate in a study lasting approximately 1 hour. I understand that I will be asked to imagine that I am a member of the local population of a war-torn country and will be presented with a written description of recent conditions in the country. At different points in the scenario I will be asked to respond to questions that assess a variety of my perceptions *as a member of the local population*. I will also be asked to complete a short Biographical Data Form.

I have been told that the risks associated with this research are acceptable (e.g., minor eye strain). However, if asked questions that make me feel uncomfortable, I may decline to answer and I may terminate my participation at any time without penalty. Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed in any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC Toronto.

I have been advised that all data I provide will be treated as strictly confidential, and will not be revealed to anyone other than the DRDC Toronto Investigators without my consent, except as data unidentified as to source. I also understand that the data concerning me may be used in future research projects by researchers in collaboration with the Investigators.

I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or penalty at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation as a participant will cease immediately. In this case I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed. I also understand that the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that for my participation in this research project, I am entitled to a remuneration in the form of a stress allowance in the amount of \$32.56.

Please note that stress remuneration is taxable. T4A slips are issued only for amounts in excess of \$500.00 paid during a year.

Also, I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication arising from this study. Moreover, should it be required, I agree to allow the experimental data to be reviewed by an internal or external audit committee with the understanding that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.

I also understand that by signing this consent form I have not waived any legal rights I may have as a result of any harm to me occasioned by my participation in this research project beyond the risks I have assumed.

Section Head: \_\_\_\_\_(DRDC civilian participants only)

Participant's name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

#### SECONDARY USE OF DATA:

I consent/do not consent (circle as appropriate) to the use of this study's experimental data involving me in unidentified form in future related studies provided that review and approval have been given by DRDC HREC.

#### PARTICIPATION IN OTHER RESEARCH PROJECTS:

I have informed the Principal Investigator that I am currently a participant in the following other research project(s): \_\_\_\_\_, and that I am participating as a participant in the following research project(s) at institutions other than DRDC:

\_\_\_\_\_.

#### FOR SUBJECT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence Research and Development Canada -Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

- Principal Investigator: Dr. Ritu M. Gill, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3002, [ritu.gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:ritu.gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)
- Co-Investigator and Project Manager: Dr. Angela Febbraro, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3120, [angela.febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:angela.febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)
- Co-Investigator: Dr. Megan Thompson, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 2040, [megan.thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:megan.thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)
- Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HERC): Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, [jack.landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:jack.landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)

I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required.

## C.2 Voluntary Consent Form (Participants outside of DRDC)

### Protocol Number: L-701A

**Title:** Understanding the Relationship between Military Organizations and a Local Population: A Pilot Study

**Principal Investigator:** Dr. Ritu M. Gill, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto

**Co-Investigators:** Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Ms. Marissa Barnes, York University

**Thrust:** 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander (Applied Research Project in Land Command Thrust, PG2)

I \_\_\_\_\_ (name) of \_\_\_\_\_ (address and phone number) hereby volunteer to participate as a participant in the study “Understanding the Relationship between Military Organizations and a Local Population” (Protocol L-701A). I have read the Information Letter, and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Principal Investigator. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research project and have any questions about this study answered by contacting Dr. Ritu M. Gill at 416-635-2000 Extension 3002, or Dr. Jack Landolt at 416-635-2000 Extension 2120.

I have been told that I will be asked to participate in a study lasting approximately 1 hour. I understand that I will be asked to imagine that I am a member of the local population of a war-torn country and will be presented with a written description of recent conditions in the country. At different points in the scenario I will be asked to respond to questions that assess a variety of my perceptions *as a member of the local population*. I will also be asked to complete a short Biographical Data Form.

I have been told that the risks associated with this research are acceptable (e.g., minor eye strain). However, if asked questions that make me feel uncomfortable, I may decline to answer and I may terminate my participation at any time without penalty. Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed in any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC Toronto.

I have been advised that all data I provide will be treated as strictly confidential, and will not be revealed to anyone other than the DRDC Toronto Investigators without my consent, except as data unidentified as to source. I also understand that the data concerning me may be used in future research projects by researchers in collaboration with the Investigators.

I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or penalty at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation as a participant will cease immediately. In this case I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed. I also understand that the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that for my participation in this research project, I am entitled to a remuneration in the form of a stress allowance in the amount of \$30.40.

Please note that stress remuneration is taxable. T4A slips are issued only for amounts in excess of \$500.00 paid during a year.

Also, I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication arising from this study. Moreover, should it be required, I agree to allow the experimental data to be reviewed by an internal or external audit committee with the understanding that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.

I also understand that by signing this consent form I have not waived any legal rights I may have as a result of any harm to me occasioned by my participation in this research project beyond the risks I have assumed.

Participant's name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Principal Investigator: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

#### SECONDARY USE OF DATA:

I consent/do not consent (circle as appropriate) to the use of this study's experimental data involving me in unidentified form in future related studies provided that review and approval have been given by DRDC HREC.

#### PARTICIPATION IN OTHER RESEARCH PROJECTS:

I have informed the Principal Investigator that I am currently a participant in the following other research project(s): \_\_\_\_\_, and that I am participating as a participant in the following research project(s) at institutions other than DRDC:

\_\_\_\_\_.

#### FOR SUBJECT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence Research and Development Canada -Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

- Principal Investigator: Ritu M. Gill, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3002, [ritu.gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:ritu.gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)
- Co-Investigator and Project Manager: Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3120, [angela.febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:angela.febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)
- Co-Investigator: Dr. Megan Thompson, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 2040, [megan.thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:megan.thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)
- Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC): Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, [jack.landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca](mailto:jack.landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca)



I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required.

## Annex D Biographical Data Form

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1. Age \_\_\_\_\_
2. Gender (please check the appropriate box):
  - ☐ Male
  - ☐ Female
3. Marital Status: (please check the appropriate box):
  - ☐ Single
  - ☐ Married
  - ☐ Divorced
  - ☐ Separated
  - ☐ Widowed
  - ☐ Common-Law
4. Highest Level of Education (please check the appropriate box):
  - ☐ Some High School
  - ☐ Completed High School
  - ☐ Some College
  - ☐ Completed College
  - ☐ Some Trade School
  - ☐ Completed Trade School
  - ☐ Some University
  - ☐ Completed Undergraduate Degree
  - ☐ University Professional Degree
  - ☐ Some Graduate Courses
  - ☐ Master's Degree
  - ☐ Doctorate
5. Ethnic Background (please check the appropriate box):
  - ☐ White
  - ☐ Chinese
  - ☐ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.)
  - ☐ Black
  - ☐ Filipino
  - ☐ Latin American
  - ☐ Southeast Asian (e.g., Cambodian, Indonesian, Vietnamese, etc.)
  - ☐ Arab
  - ☐ West Asian (e.g., Afghan, Iranian, etc.)
  - ☐ Japanese
  - ☐ Korean
  - ☐ Aboriginal
  - ☐ Other – please specify \_\_\_\_\_

6. Country of Birth: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Country of Citizenship: \_\_\_\_\_
8. If applicable, which countries did you reside in before coming to Canada:  
\_\_\_\_\_
9. Number of years residing in Canada: \_\_\_\_\_
10. First language:
- ☐ English
  - ☐ French
  - ☐ Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

## Annex E

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### E.1 Competence Violation Scenario

Please read the following scenario, and **imagine yourself in the following situation as a native of the country Safia**, where you and your family are from and are residing.

#### **Background of Safia:**

Your country, Safia, has been ravaged for the past two decades by wars, massive poverty, and horrendous crimes against humanity. The life expectancy of your people is 44 years, with half of the total population living below the poverty line. The adult literacy rate is 29%, with only 3% of women being literate and in some areas less than 1% of the population is literate. In Safia, one woman dies from pregnancy-related causes every 30 minutes, and one out of five children dies before the age of 5. The average monthly wage in your country is the equivalent of CDN\$50, the average monthly rent is CDN\$250, and the average monthly food/expenses cost is CDN\$250. The scale of poverty in your land has led to massive corruption.

Agriculture is the main occupation, although less than 10% of the land is cultivated. A large percentage of the arable land was damaged by warfare during the 1980s and 1990s. Crops include wheat and other grains, fruits, and nuts. One of Safia's main crops includes the cocoa leaf, which has both medicinal and nutritional value. Road conditions throughout Safia are poor; pack animals are an important means of transport within the country.

A few years ago a local terrorist group started to take over your country declaring themselves the legitimate government of Safia. The local terrorist group controlled 90% of your country by the year 2000, but their government was not generally recognized by the international community. In order to deal with the terrorist threat, to assist in rebuilding the nation, and to provide a better quality of life for you and local Safians, Safian government members who oppose the local terrorists and their dictatorship have asked for assistance from the international community. The country of Massey responded to that request and several thousand military troops from Massey were deployed to Safia. Massey is a member of the United Nations organization and has been since the organization's creation. Massey has assisted other countries in times of need. The Massey military has responded to this request not only because their government wanted them to but also because they want to help Safians. The Massey government and military has vowed to assist Safia, setting goals for the Massey military to demolish the ruling of the local terrorist organization, and to improve human rights, as well as to re-build the nation to provide improved health care and road/travel conditions, an educational system, and political infrastructure.

**PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONNAIRES.**

*Participant completes baseline/pre-violation questionnaires.*

**PLEASE CONTINUE READING SCENARIO ON NEXT PAGE.**

### **The Situation in Safia since the arrival of the Massey Military:**

You and many of the locals in Safia expected to attain peace and development in Safia, assisted greatly by the presence of the Massey military. However, after 4 years, little progress seems to have been made. The United Nations (UN) Development Programme has stated that, “reconstruction and development is urgently needed, otherwise this fragile nation could easily slip back into chaos and abject poverty. Very little has been invested in reconstruction. Out of 21,000 kilometers of roads, only 2,793 kilometers are paved. There are 47 airports, but only 10 have paved runways, and only 3 of them are over 3,047 meters.”

The Massey military does not allow the workers of the UN and international non-governmental organizations to travel on the Safian national airline, because they deemed it to be unsafe. Instead a number of non-Safian private airline companies provide services for foreign workers under the “provision of services for humanitarian, relief and development projects and organizations.” They charge between CDN\$73-1900 per journey depending on the distance and the security of the area. This preference for travel on non-Safian private airline companies versus the local Safian airline takes funds away from local Safians and places them in the hands of the non-Safian airline companies. This decision represents the lack of skills and knowledge of the Massey military in terms of knowing what is needed for effective reconstruction in Safia. You and other Safians see this as but one example of the incompetence of the Massey military.

Furthermore, the local Safians living in urban areas have electricity only a few hours per day, mainly in the evenings. Around 40 international organizations, including the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the UN, are operating in Safia. They are all under heavily armed protection. They have their own supply of electricity, water and gas, provided by the Massey military. Local Safians are resentful of the fact that after 4 years they do not have regular and consistent access to electricity, gas and clean water, while foreigners enjoy these facilities. The Massey military states that they know of this discrepancy, and cannot change it because they do not have the knowledge or technical skills to manage access to these resources so that resources are equally accessible to everyone.

In addition, a major justification for the Massey military presence was that it would improve human rights. Four years later, there is very little evidence to demonstrate improvements in human rights. Furthermore, over the last 4 years Massey military actions have led to local Safian civilian casualties and have destroyed infrastructure needed for effective aid and development. The local terrorist group is turning the weaknesses of the Massey military forces into its own strengths. As a result, some of the local Safians are now giving their support to the local terrorist organization, which is now seen by some as the de facto governing power, with a rumoured strong presence in over 70% of the country.

The local terrorist organization has succeeded in attracting sympathy beyond its traditional support base and has gained a measure of political legitimacy among some Safians. For instance, as indicated earlier, one of Safia’s main crops includes the cocoa leaf. Safians use the cocoa leaf to produce tea leaves and sell the leaves for profit, providing them with a source of income. However, because the cocoa leaf has also been used by insurgents to make illegal drugs, which is a source of funding for the insurgency, the Massey military has implemented a policy of forced cocoa leaf eradication. This policy not only removes a source of funding for the insurgency, but also has a negative effect on Safians by destroying the local Safians’ source of income without providing them with an alternative livelihood. The terrorist organization has

managed to present itself as a protector of local livelihoods by allowing cocoa leaf production to continue in the areas under its control.

Also, inconsistently implemented efforts by the Massey military for development and reconstruction appear to be underfunded and to have failed to significantly impact Safians' living conditions. Underlying this support of the terrorist organization is the Massey military's failure to deliver on many promises of a better life made to the local people of Safia. The lack of ability of the Massey military to give sufficient focus to the needs and desires of Safians and channel them into effective policy responses is a key aspect of the insurgency's rising popularity.

Consequently, despite the good intentions of the Massey mission in Safia, some locals who once welcomed the Massey military are becoming frustrated and disenchanted. The increase in the geographic representation of the local terrorist organization across Safia indicates that the political, military, and economic strategies of the terrorist organization are now more successful in Safia than are the strategies of the Massey military.

In a recent statement the Safian government accused the Massey military of being unable to defeat the insurgency and improve conditions in Safia due to their lack of knowledge and technical skills required for the effective rebuilding of Safia.

**PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONNAIRES.**

*Participant completes post-violation questionnaires.*

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO CONTINUE READING SCENARIO.**

*Participant is presented with either the apology or denial trust repair:*

*Apology:*

In response to this accusation, the Massey military released a statement admitting that such problems existed and apologized for the lack of progress to date. They also stated that the problems would be addressed and would not happen in the future.

*Denial:*

In response to this accusation, the Massey military released a statement denying all responsibility for the current problems in Safia, attributing the accusation to "political posturing" by the Safian government in an effort to avoid acknowledging their own role in this situation.

**PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONNAIRES.**

*Participant completes post-repair questionnaires.*

## **E.2 Integrity Violation Scenario**

Please read the following scenario, **and imagine yourself in the following situation as a native of the country Safia**, where you and your family are from and are residing.

### **Background of Safia:**

Your country, Safia, has been ravaged for the past two decades by wars, massive poverty, and horrendous crimes against humanity. The life expectancy of your people is 44 years, with half of the total population living below the poverty line. The adult literacy rate is 29%, with only 3% of women being literate and in some areas less than 1% of the population is literate. In Safia, one woman dies from pregnancy-related causes every 30 minutes, and one out of five children dies before the age of 5. The average monthly wage in your country is the equivalent of CDN\$50, the average monthly rent is CDN\$250, and the average monthly food/expenses cost is CDN\$250. The scale of poverty in your land has led to massive corruption.

Agriculture is the main occupation, although less than 10% of the land is cultivated. A large percentage of the arable land was damaged by warfare during the 1980s and 1990s. Crops include wheat and other grains, fruits, and nuts. One of Safia's main crops includes the cocoa leaf, which has both medicinal and nutritional value. Road conditions throughout Safia are poor; pack animals are an important means of transport within the country.

A few years ago a local terrorist group started to take over your country declaring themselves the legitimate government of Safia. The local terrorist group controlled 90% of your country by the year 2000, but their government was not generally recognized by the international community. In order to deal with the terrorist threat, to assist in rebuilding the nation, and to provide a better quality of life for you and local Safians, Safian government members who oppose the local terrorists and their dictatorship have asked for assistance from the international community. The country of Massey responded to that request and several thousand military troops from Massey were deployed to Safia. Massey is a member of the United Nations organization and has been since the organization's creation. Massey has assisted other countries in times of need. The Massey military has responded to this request not only because their government wanted them to but also because they want to help Safians. The Massey government and military has vowed to assist Safia, setting goals for the Massey military to demolish the ruling of the local terrorist organization, and to improve human rights, as well as to re-build the nation to provide improved health care and road/travel conditions, an educational system, and political infrastructure.

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.**

*Participant completes baseline/pre-violation questionnaires.*

**PLEASE CONTINUE READING SCENARIO ON NEXT PAGE.**

### **The Situation in Safia since the arrival of the Massey Military:**

You and many of the locals in Safia expected to attain peace and development in Safia, assisted greatly by the presence of the Massey military. However, after 4 years, little progress seems to have been made. The United Nations (UN) Development Programme has stated that, “reconstruction and development is urgently needed, otherwise this fragile nation could easily slip back into chaos and abject poverty. Very little has been invested in reconstruction. Out of 21,000 kilometers of roads, only 2,793 kilometers are paved. There are 47 airports, but only 10 have paved runways, and only 3 of them are over 3,047 meters.”

The Massey military does not allow the workers of the UN and international non-governmental organizations to travel on the Safian national airline, because they deemed it to be unsafe. Instead a number of non-Safian private airline companies provide services for foreign workers under the “provision of services for humanitarian, relief and development projects and organizations.” They charge between CDN\$73-1900 per journey depending on the distance and the security of the area. This preference for travel on non-Safian private airline companies versus the local Safian airline takes funds away from local Safians and places them in the hands of the non-Safian airline companies. This discrepancy represents a lapse in judgment, as well as a lack of integrity of the Massey military in terms of intentionally taking funds away from Safia. You and other Safians see this as but one example of the lack of integrity of the Massey military.

Furthermore, the local Safians living in urban areas have electricity only a few hours per day, mainly in the evenings. Around 40 international organizations, including the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the UN, are operating in Safia. They are all under heavily armed protection. They have their own supply of electricity, water and gas, provided by the Massey military. Local Safians are resentful of the fact that after 4 years they do not have regular and consistent access to electricity, gas and clean water, while foreigners enjoy these facilities. The Massey military states that they know of this discrepancy, but insist that they do not control access to these resources and therefore are unable to give Safians regular and consistent access to resources. However, there is plenty of evidence to indicate that the Massey military does indeed have full control over these resources.

In addition, a major justification for the Massey military presence was that it would improve human rights. Four years later, there is very little evidence to demonstrate improvements in human rights. Furthermore, over the last 4 years Massey military actions have led to local Safian civilian casualties and have destroyed infrastructure needed for effective aid and development. The local terrorist group is turning the weaknesses of the Massey military forces into its own strengths. As a result, some of the local Safians are now giving their support to the local terrorist organization, which is now seen by some as the de facto governing power, with a rumoured strong presence in over 70% of the country.

The local terrorist organization has succeeded in attracting sympathy beyond its traditional support base and has gained a measure of political legitimacy among some Safians. For instance, as indicated earlier, one of Safia’s main crops includes the cocoa leaf. Safians use the cocoa leaf to produce tea leaves and sell the leaves for profit, providing them with a source of income. However, because the cocoa leaf has also been used by insurgents to make illegal drugs, which is a source of funding for the insurgency, the Massey military has implemented a policy of forced cocoa leaf eradication. This policy not only removes a source of funding for the insurgency, but also has a negative effect on Safians by destroying the local Safians’ source of



income without providing them with an alternative livelihood. The terrorist organization has managed to present itself as a protector of local livelihoods by allowing cocoa leaf production to continue in the areas under its control.

Also, inconsistently implemented efforts by the Massey military for development and reconstruction appear to be underfunded and to have failed to have a significant impact on Safians' living conditions. Underlying this support of the terrorist organization is the Massey military's failure to deliver on many promises of a better life made to the local people of Safia. Their failure to give sufficient focus to the needs and desires of Safians and channel them into effective policy responses is a key aspect of the insurgency's rising popularity.

Consequently, despite the good intentions of the Massey mission in Safia, some locals who once welcomed them are becoming frustrated and disenchanted. The increase in the geographic representation of the local terrorist organization across Safia indicates that the political, military, and economic strategies of the terrorist organization are now more successful in Safia than are the strategies of the Massey military.

In a recent statement the Safian government accused the Massey military of being unable to defeat the insurgency and improve conditions in Safia due to intentionally not providing the level of assistance they are able to and should be providing, and being complicit in assisting foreign companies to make profits from the suffering of Safians.

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.**

*Participant completes post-violation questionnaires.*

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO CONTINUE READING SCENARIO.**

*Participant is presented with the apology or denial trust repair:*

*Apology:*

In response to this accusation, the Massey military released a statement admitting that such problems existed and apologized for the lack of progress to date. They also stated that the problems would be addressed and would not happen in the future.

*Denial:*

In response to this accusation, the Massey military released a statement denying all responsibility for the current problems in Safia, attributing the accusation to "political posturing" by the Safian government in an effort to avoid acknowledging their own role in this situation.

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.**

*Participant completes post-repair questionnaires.*

### **E.3 No Violation (Control) Scenario**

Please read the following scenario, and **imagine yourself in the following situation as a native of the country Safia**, where you and your family are from and are residing.

#### **Background of Safia:**

Your country, Safia, has been ravaged for the past two decades by wars, massive poverty, and horrendous crimes against humanity. The life expectancy of your people is 44 years, with half of the total population living below the poverty line. The adult literacy rate is 29%, with only 3% of women being literate and in some areas less than 1% of the population is literate. In Safia, one woman dies from pregnancy-related causes every 30 minutes, and one out of five children dies before the age of 5. The average monthly wage in your country is the equivalent of CDN\$50, the average monthly rent is CDN\$250, and the average monthly food/expenses cost is CDN\$250. The scale of poverty in your land has led to massive corruption.

Agriculture is the main occupation, although less than 10% of the land is cultivated. A large percentage of the arable land was damaged by warfare during the 1980s and 1990s. Crops include wheat and other grains, fruits, and nuts. One of Safia's main crops includes the cocoa leaf, which has both medicinal and nutritional value. Road conditions throughout Safia are poor; pack animals are an important means of transport within the country.

A few years ago a local terrorist group started to take over your country declaring themselves the legitimate government of Safia. The local terrorist group controlled 90% of your country by the year 2000, but their government was not generally recognized by the international community. In order to deal with the terrorist threat, to assist in rebuilding the nation, and to provide a better quality of life for you and local Safians, Safian government members who oppose the local terrorists and their dictatorship have asked for assistance from the international community. The country of Massey responded to that request and several thousand military troops from Massey were deployed to Safia. Massey is a member of the United Nations organization and has been since the organization's creation. Massey has assisted other countries in times of need. The Massey military has responded to this request not only because their government wanted them to but also because they want to help Safians. The Massey government and military has vowed to assist Safia, setting goals for the Massey military to demolish the ruling of the local terrorist organization, and to improve human rights, as well as to re-build the nation to provide improved health care and road/travel conditions, an educational system, and political infrastructure.

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.**

*Participant completes baseline/pre-violation questionnaires.*

**PLEASE CONTINUE READING SCENARIO ON NEXT PAGE.**

### **The Situation in Safia since the arrival of the Massey Military:**

You and many of the locals in Safia expected to attain peace and development in Safia, assisted greatly by the presence of the Massey military. After 4 years, progress seems to have been made. The United Nations (UN) Development Programme has stated that, “reconstruction and development is urgently needed, otherwise this fragile nation could easily slip back into chaos and abject poverty. Very little has been invested in reconstruction. Out of 21,000 kilometers of roads, only 2,793 kilometers are paved. There are 47 airports, but only 10 have paved runways, and only 3 of them are over 3,047 meters.”

The Massey military allows the workers of the UN and international non-governmental organizations to travel on the Safian national airline, because they deemed it to be safe. In addition, a number of non-Safian private airline companies provide services for foreign workers under the “provision of services for humanitarian, relief and development projects and organizations.” You and other Safians see this as but one example of the effective role that the Massey military has played in reconstruction, demonstrating the effectiveness of this mission.

The locals living in urban areas have electricity. The 40 international organizations, including the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the UN, which are operating in Safia, have their own supply of electricity, water and gas. Local Safians are pleased to see that after 4 years of not having access to electricity, gas and clean water, presently Safians and foreigners are enjoying these facilities.

A major justification for the Massey military presence was that it would improve human rights. Four years later, there is reasonable evidence to demonstrate improvements in human rights. Furthermore, over the last 4 years Massey military actions have led to a decrease in local Safian civilian casualties and greater aid and development. The local terrorist group is unable to turn any weaknesses of the Massey military forces into its own strengths. As a result, the local Safians continue to give their support to the Massey military, and the local terrorist organization is now losing its presence in Safia.

The local terrorist organization has been unsuccessful in attracting sympathy beyond its traditional support base and has lost a measure of political legitimacy among many Safians. For instance, the Massey military has removed a policy of forced cocoa leaf eradication implemented in certain sectors by the terrorist organization, which had destroyed the local Safians’ source of income without providing them with an alternative livelihood. While the cocoa leaf may be used to make tea, it may also be used to make illegal drugs, such as cocaine. The latter was produced and manufactured by the local terrorist organization, providing them with a source of funding. The Massey military has removed this cocoa leaf eradication policy in order to allow Safians to maintain their source of income through producing cocoa tea, while maintaining control over the cocoa leaf crops to ensure the insurgents do not have access to the crops. The Massey military has managed to maintain the local livelihoods of Safians by allowing cocoa leaf production to continue in the areas under its control, while simultaneously preventing the terrorist organization from manufacturing cocaine.

Also, where implemented, international development and reconstruction efforts have been properly funded and have made a significant impact on Safians’ living conditions. The Massey military has delivered on many promises of a better life made to the local people of Safia. Overall, the Massey military has reasonably achieved its reconstruction goals in Safia.

In a recent statement the Safian government stated that the Massey military has been making reasonable progress in defeating the insurgency and improving conditions in Safia.

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.**

*Participant completes post-violation questionnaires.*

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO CONTINUE READING SCENARIO.**

In response to the above statement, senior Massey military officials have responded with appreciation for the acknowledgement of their reasonable achievements.

**PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.**

## Annex F Questionnaires

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Please read the following three questions and circle the response you believe to be correct.

*(Manipulation Checks: To be administered post-repair) (Kim et al., 2004)*

**1. In the scenario you read, the Massey military was accused of being unable to defeat the insurgency and improve conditions of Safia due to:**

- a) its inadequate knowledge and technical skills required to complete these tasks effectively
- b) intentionally not providing the level of assistance it should be providing
- c) it was not accused of anything

**2. What does this accusation bring into question:**

- a) primarily the Massey military's technical ability (e.g., knowledge)
- b) primarily the Massey military's integrity
- c) Not applicable (there was no accusation)

**3. What was the Massey military's response to the accusation:**

- a) admitted responsibility and apologized for the infraction
- b) denied the accusation completely
- c) didn't admit/deny the allegation as there was no allegation

Based on what you have read in the scenario thus far, and using the scale below, please answer each of the following questions while imagining yourself **to be a local Safian**. There are no right or wrong answers.

*(Trust Beliefs: To be administered baseline, post-violation, and post-repair) (Mayer & Davis, 1995)*

A.

**1. The Massey military is very capable of performing its job.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**2. The Massey military is highly skilled in the work that needs to be done on the job.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**3. I feel very confident about the skills and abilities of the Massey military.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**4. The Massey military possesses the skills and abilities to be successful at the things it tries to do.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**5. The Massey military has specialized capabilities that can improve conditions in Safia.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**6. The Massey military is technically well qualified.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**B.**

**1. The Massey military is very concerned about the welfare of Safians.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**2. Safians' needs and desires are very important to the Massey military.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**3. The Massey military would not knowingly do anything to hurt Safians.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**4. The Massey military really looks out for what is important to Safians.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**5. The Massey military will go out of its way to help Safians.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

C.

**1. The Massey military has a strong sense of justice.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**2. Safians never have to wonder whether the Massey military will stick to its word.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**3. The Massey military tries hard to be fair in dealings with others.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**4. Sound principles and ethics seem to guide the behavior of the Massey military.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |



**5. I like the values of the Massey military.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

**6. The Massey military's actions and behaviors are very consistent.**

|          |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| 1        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7        |
| Strongly |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly |
| Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Agree    |

*(Trust Intention: To be administered baseline, post-violation, and post-repair) (Mayer & Davis, 1995)*

A.

**1. I would let the Massey military continue to have influence over issues that are important to me for the duration of its mission here.**

|                      |   |   |   |   |   |                   |
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| 1                    | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7                 |
| Strongly<br>Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly<br>Agree |

**2. I would be willing to let the Massey military have continuing control over my future in Safia until Safia reaches stability.**

|                      |   |   |   |   |   |                   |
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| 1                    | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7                 |
| Strongly<br>Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly<br>Agree |

**3. I do not need to keep an eye on the behaviors of the Massey military.**

|                      |   |   |   |   |   |                   |
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| 1                    | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7                 |
| Strongly<br>Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly<br>Agree |

**4. I would be comfortable giving the Massey military a task or problem that was critical to me, even if I could not monitor its actions.**

|                      |   |   |   |   |   |                   |
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| 1                    | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7                 |
| Strongly<br>Disagree |   |   |   |   |   | Strongly<br>Agree |

*Open-Ended Items (To be administered post-repair)*

1. As a local member of Safia, in order to gain your trust, what would you have liked the Massey military to have said or done?
2. If Safia were a real country what country do you think it might be?

## Annex G Debriefing

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### DEBRIEFING FORM FOR HUMAN SUBJECT PARTICIPATION

**Title:** Understanding the Relationship between Military Organizations and a Local Population: A Pilot Study

**Principal Investigator:** Dr. Ritu M. Gill, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto

**Co-Investigators:** Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Ms. Marissa Barnes, York University

**Thrust:** 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander (Applied Research Project in Land Command Thrust, PG2)

Dear Participant:

Thank you for having completed this experiment.

For this experiment you were asked to imagine yourself in a scenario and complete a series of questionnaires designed to assess your perceptions in response to the scenario. Specifically we described a fictitious country, Safia, which had been devastated by the effects of an insurgency. In response to a call by the Safian government, the Massey government (also fictitious) deployed troops to assist in defeating the insurgency, in reconstruction and development, and in restoring human rights. The scenario then went on to describe a series of events that had taken place since the arrival of the Massey troops.

The goal of this study is to begin to better understand the relations between military organizations and the local population being assisted, in particular since foreign military organizations have entered complex theatres of operations, such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Africa. In such complex missions a variety of setbacks can and have occurred. Local populations receiving support from military organizations have initially responded to such assistance with trust and support; however, over time, a decrease in trust and support has in some cases been noted (Senlis Council, 2007; van der Kloet, 2006).

More specifically this study is designed to gain insight into the responses to particular types of trust violations between military organizations, such as the Canadian Forces, and the local population being assisted. A second goal of this study is to determine which trust repair responses are optimal for restoring trust. Thus, this study will aim to provide information on how to repair trust violations effectively between military organizations and the local population being assisted.

The questionnaires that you completed will be used to measure various dimensions of trust, including trust intentions, trust beliefs, and willingness to risk in the future. We are interested in assessing how dimensions of trust may vary according to what type of trust violation and trust repair mechanism you experienced. Specifically, there is some recent research that has suggested that, in some cases, denial is a more effective trust repair mechanism than is an apology (e.g., for an integrity violation), whereas in other cases an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism than denial (e.g., for a competence violation) (Kim, Cooper, Ferrin, & Dirks, 2004). We are particularly interested in seeing if these sorts of findings are applicable in the case of the trust violations that can occur during the complexity of international military engagements.

### *Risks and Benefits*

There are minimal anticipated physical, social, psychological, economic, or other risks associated with this research. The potential benefits of participation in this research include gaining insight into one's perceptions of the relationship between military organizations and the local population they are assisting, as well as insight into the nature of trust development in complex security environments.

### *Further reading*

Gizewski, P., & Rostek, M. (2007). Toward a JIMP-capable land force. *Canadian Army Journal*, 10(1), 55-72.

Kim, P.H., Cooper, C.D., Ferrin, D.L., & Dirks, K.T. (2004). Removing the shadow of suspicion: The effects of apology versus denial for repairing competence versus integrity-based trust violations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(1), 104-118.

Mayer, R.C., & Davis, J.H. (1995). The effect of the performance appraisal system on trust for management: A field quasi-experiment. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 84(1), 123-136.

The Senlis Council. (2007). *Peace in Afghanistan – Made in Canada*. Ottawa, Canada.

van der Kloet, I. (2006). Building trust in the mission area: A weapon against terrorism? *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17(4), 421-436.

## List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

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|      |   |
|------|---|
| ARP  | Applied Research Project                  |
| CDN  | Canadian                                  |
| CF   | Canadian Forces                           |
| DRDC | Defence Research and Development Canada   |
| HREC | Human Research Ethics Committee           |
| JIMP | Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organizations            |
| SDs  | Standard Deviations                       |
| UN   | United Nations                            |
| URPP | Undergraduate Research Participant Pool   |
| US   | United States                             |

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| <b>4. AUTHORS</b> (First name, middle initial and last name. If military, show rank, e.g. Maj. John E. Doe.)<br><br><b>Ritu Gill, Angela R. Febbraro &amp; Megan M. Thompson</b>   |   |  |
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- (U) This study was designed to support the Applied Research Project (ARP) entitled, "JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander," developed at Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto. The objective of this project is to examine the public aspect of the Joint, Interagency, Multinational, & Public (JIMP) paradigm, which is a relatively new focus for many militaries and poses the greatest challenge in terms of interfacing with non-military players; moreover, the costs of losing the 'hearts and minds' of a local population has significant implications for mission success and for the security of the soldiers deployed in counterinsurgency contexts. The present study represents a pilot study that will support a subsequent larger study examining trust violations and trust repair between military organizations and the local population that the military is assisting. Recent research in the organizational psychology literature suggests that, in some cases (e.g., for an integrity violation), denial is a more effective trust repair mechanism than is an apology, whereas in other cases (e.g., for a competence violation), an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism than denial. This study examined the applicability of these findings to complex international military engagements using a scenario-based experimental paradigm. Initial trust was compared to trust post violation and was found to be higher than trust post violation, providing evidence that initial trust in the military was strong enough to be violated when a trust violation occurred. Qualitative analyses conducted on participants' responses to determine what they would have liked the military to have done to increase their trust. Several themes emerged that are consistent with current approaches adopted by the Canadian Forces for improving trust and cooperation with a local population in theatre. Results also indicated that some adjustments are required to strengthen the trust violation manipulation, whereas the trust repair manipulation was found to be strong.
- (U) La présente étude visait à étayer le projet de recherche appliquée (PRA) intitulé « Éléments interarmées, interorganisationnels, multinationaux et publics (IIMP) essentiels du domaine public : exigences à l'endroit des commandants tactiques » élaboré à Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC), à Toronto. L'objectif de ce projet est d'examiner l'aspect « public » du paradigme IIMP, une approche relativement nouvelle pour un grand nombre de militaires et le plus grand des défis pour les organisations militaires en ce qui a trait aux relations avec des parties non militaires; de plus, les coûts associés à la perte du « cœur et de l'esprit » d'une population locale a des incidences importantes sur la réussite d'une mission et la sécurité des soldats déployés dans un contexte de contre-insurrection. La présente étude est une étude pilote sur laquelle s'appuiera une étude à plus grande échelle qui examinera les bris de confiance et la restauration de la confiance entre les organisations militaires et la population locale à laquelle ces organisations apportent de l'aide. Dans la littérature en psychologie organisationnelle, des études récentes portent à croire que, dans certains cas (p. ex. pour un manquement à l'intégrité), la dénégaration est un mécanisme plus efficace de restauration de la confiance que la présentation d'excuses, tandis que dans d'autres cas (p. ex. pour un manquement à la compétence), la présentation d'excuses est un moyen plus efficace de restauration de la confiance que la dénégaration. La présente étude s'est penchée sur l'applicabilité de ces résultats aux engagements militaires internationaux complexes à l'aide d'un paradigme expérimental fondé sur des scénarios. On a comparé la confiance avant un bris de confiance et après, et découvert que la confiance était plus élevée avant un bris de confiance, ce qui montre que la confiance initiale envers les



organisations militaires était suffisamment solide pour être altérée par le bris de confiance. Les analyses qualitatives des réponses des participants quant aux comportements qu'ils auraient souhaité que les organisations militaires adoptent pour accroître leur confiance ont permis de dégager plusieurs éléments qui concordent avec les démarches actuelles suivies par les Forces canadiennes afin de raffermir la confiance et la volonté de collaboration avec la population locale dans le théâtre des opérations. D'après les résultats de l'étude pilote, il faudra apporter quelques modifications pour renforcer les manipulations visant à briser la confiance; les manipulations visant à restaurer la confiance se sont, quant à elles, révélées solides.

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(U) Trust Violation; Trust Repair; Military Organizations; Local Population

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